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Introduction 
At the present time, railway transport in the European Union (EU) is going through a  
renaissance – at the level of plans and goals of transport policy at least (for more detail see 
e.g. European Conference of Ministers of Transport 1993, European Commission 2001, 
Seidenglanz 2005, Barrot 2005). This interpretation is the basis for proposals, conceptions 
and strategies of a reform of railway transport’s institutional structure in EU member 
countries, i.e. in the Czech Republic as well, including identification of related problems (see 
Ministerstvo dopravy 2005 or e.g. Kloutvor – Šíp – Vorlíček 2001, Nash – Rivera-Trujillo 
2004, and Šíp 2005). An indispensable part of these reforms are liberalisation and 
privatisation of railway transport services, as well as separation of operation as such from 
administration and ownership of infrastructure, i.e. from the railway network with its 
necessary technological facilities. An absolutely fundamental complication is posed by an 
actually automatic assumption that the railway transport network, formed in the second half of 
the 19th century, covers the economically relevant destinations and directions, as well as its 
network covers the economically relevant territory from the regional point of view. Thus, it is 
assumed that the railway network was formed on the basis of economic needs, ensuring profit 
for the owners of railways and for transport operators, and providing transport services in 
regions, in such directions and volumes that were effectively demanded. The railway network 
is thus automatically regarded as a parallel to the public road network; according to this 
interpretation, railway network density (as calculated per square kilometre of territory or per 
capita – see Table 2.1) represents a positive factor.  
 
The present text aims at demonstrating that the railway transport network in the Czech 
Republic does not fulfil the above-mentioned assumptions, i.e. that it was constituted in 
circumstances which were only in some cases in conformity with the assumption of 
economically efficient operation. Therefore, it is illusory to think that privatisation of railway 
transport services will result in their preservation in the future or in their reconstruction in an 
extent and quality presumed by conceptions of revitalisation of railways. The principal 
method here is application of the principle of “path dependence“ on railway transport, 
following the approach that “history matters“, just like this principle is used in the works by 
e.g. Puffert (2002), David (1993), or Arthur (1994). The application of methodology of path 
dependence within the framework of the present text and the resultant conclusions also 
correspond to the approach adopted by Liebowitz and Margolis (1995a), who are otherwise 
critical to the general use of the historical method. Another idea is also an empirical finding 
that railway lines built with the use of the biggest subsidies are the least efficient in terms of 
operation (Gathon – Pastieau 1995 and Campos – Cantos 2000, p. 233).  
 
The procedure will be as follows: first, I will describe the chosen methodology of solution and 
I will explain the economic aspect of the problem; next, I will define eight basic archetypes of 
establishing the individual railway lines on the Czech Republic’s territory in the context of 
present-day economic and political conditions; these findings will then serve as the basis for 
my graphic analysis of the Czech railway transport network and for the formulation of a 
                                                 
1 The text is a part of a research project supported by the grant GA ČR N°402/04/2128. The author thanks to Jiří 
Dukát and to Petr Tonev for creating cartograms. 
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conclusion. The sense of this analysis is not to doubt the process of revitalisation of railways 
(and particularly not the concept of liberalisation and privatisation of railway services!), but to 
provide a real basis for the mentioned assumptions. This is where the impulse should arise for 
making the targets of revitalisation of railways in the Czech Republic and its supposed results 
more realistic, as well as for reconsidering the expected (or rather just anticipated) costs of the 
process. This text‘s ambition is to enrich the present-day economic debate on the current state 
and the future of railway transport in the Czech Republic by its historical context, as well as 
to refute some traditional misconceptions and clichés which contort economic analyses and 
political decision-making.   
 
1. Methodical approach to solving the problems of railways 
Railway transport is a mode of transport services, characterised by numerous specifics 
(evidenced by a number of studies, see e.g. Nash 1992, Campos – Cantos 2000, p. 171). The 
standard methodology of analysis and comparison of railway transport is based on a few 
theoretical concepts which explain the specifics of this transport service mode and set out the 
preconditions of economically efficient operation. These concepts include: (i) existence of 
sunk costs, (ii) economies of scale, (iii) economies of traffic density, and (iv) the network 
effect. The state’s transport policy is (and has always been – see Kvizda 2005) essential for 
railway transport. At the same time, the state decides about the targets, preferences and, to a 
large extent, also costs of individual transport modes, not only on the basis of economic, but 
also social criteria. When analysing railway transport, it is necessary to take into consideration 
several other theoretical concepts which, along with economic concepts, determine the 
conditions of a socially efficient operation. These concepts particularly include: (v) safety of 
operation, (vi) emission burden of operation, (vii) occupation of land, and (viii) energy 
requirements of operation. I will now discuss the individual concepts in detail and 
consequences will be drawn from them in order to determine necessary preconditions of 
efficient (both economically and socially) operation on the railway network. In conclusion of 
this part I will analyse in detail the problems of competition – (i) as a process which formed 
the railway network, (ii) as a state of the transport services market, and (iii) as an instrument 
of the state transport policy. 
 
1.1. Sunk costs 
One of the specific signs of railway transport are high fixed costs in the form of track and 
signalling. Since as early as the 19th century this phenomenon has been frequently subject to 
examination (Acworth 1905) and has become, among others, a classical example of natural 
monopoly. Although it has turned out that the original analytic methods based on cost 
accounting overestimated the volume and importance of fixed costs (Griliches 1972), these 
costs are specific for railway transport, determining its position against other modes of 
transport. This means in practical terms that railway companies tried naturally and are still 
trying to reduce the costs either absolutely, or relatively to operating costs. Absolute reduction 
of costs of infrastructure may lead to underinvestment in railway facilities at the expense of 
safety of operation – a historical example may be the neglect of maintenance of the track and 
signalling in the 1870s on the North Line of Emperor Ferdinand in Austria (Hons 1990, p. 
111), in modern times serves quite as warning the neglect of maintenance and 
underinvestment in infrastructure owned by Railtrack after an extensive privatisation of 
railways in Great Britain, resulting in tragic train accidents in Clapham and Hatfield in 2000 
(Bamford 2001, p. 79).  
 
In view of the specific nature of fixed costs of railways, it was impossible to capitalise such 
investment, not even partly, and transfer to a different business activity. That would mean the 
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gravest fear and the biggest obstacle to building a new line. One of the conditions that ensues 
from this and that had to be fulfilled by a railway established as a private enterprise, to be able 
to redeem the registered capital and to finance fixed costs of infrastructure: it had to be 
founded in the region and in the direction which generated a long-term stable and 
economically relevant demand for transport services. Because railway enterprise was so 
sensitive to investment in infrastructure, an idea evolved as early as in mid-19th century that 
the state should take over a part or the whole of the risk connected with sunk costs, i.e. 
systems of state subsidies were formed, as well as guarantees of returns on capital investments 
or state ownership of infrastructure. A railway founded by the state had to meet economic, as 
well as social goals – as far as the applied sunk costs are concerned, this means identical 
conditions as for a private railway; from the social point of view, it had to connect places and 
regions whose servicing by transport had been desirable in the long run. A relative reduction 
in costs of infrastructure is further connected with the following three concepts.  
 
1.2. Economies of scale 
Economies of scale reflect the relation between the inputs and the total volume of outputs, 
including operation and size of network. Studies based on an analysis using the Cobb-Douglas 
production and cost function (Keeler 1974, Caves – Christensen – Swanson 1980) have 
demonstrated that infrastructure is the source of a large majority of fixed costs, i.e. the track 
and land; similar studies comparing the individual modes of transport (e.g. Winston 1985, 
Wetzel – Growitsch 2006) have shown that it is just railway transport where significant 
economies of scale occur in this connection. In view of high fixed costs in the form of 
infrastructure the construction of parallel duplicate lines providing transport services to an 
approximately identical segment of customers cannot be effective – not even at the cost of 
increased competition, and therefore pressures on operational efficiency. Contrary to this, 
what appears to be efficient is that infrastructure burdened with sunk costs is used by several 
mutually competing carriers, which is exactly the core of the strategy of current railway 
reforms. However, in the era of private railways owning infrastructure and providing transport 
services, many examples denying the logic may be found. Similarly inefficient may be the 
state’s attempts to ensure transport services to a region by supporting railway transport by the 
public service order. In some parts of the network, despite the potential effect of economies of 
scale on railway, the access to services may be secured at a lower cost by bus transport. The 
same holds true for freight transport in connection with the environmental burden of the 
operation. 
 
1.3. Density of traffic  
Another important finding ensues from Keeler’s study (1974) that there are two sources of 
economies of scale: (i) returns from the size of a business and (ii) returns from the density of 
traffic. Returns (savings) from density of traffic reflect the relationship between inputs and 
outputs, while the size of network remains unchanged. Subsequent studies (namely Caves – 
Christensen – Tretheway – Windle 1985) demonstrated that it is just traffic density what is 
absolutely crucial for railway transport, whereas the size of a business is marginal (i.e. 
economies of scale are constant, whereas returns from traffic density is growing). Density of 
traffic is also a factor which, in relation to economies of scale, determines effectiveness of 
railway companies established within the framework of the present-day liberalisation and 
privatisation of railways in Europe (Stelling – Jensen 2005). It is neither easy, nor is it quite 
unambiguous to distinguish the effect of returns from density of traffic and from economies of 
scale; however, studies examining this relationship have come to the conclusion that density 
of traffic is the dominant factor of efficiency of operation (see Jara-Díaz – Cortés – Ponce 
2001). At the same time, density of traffic is the factor which provides railway with a 
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competitive advantage over other transport modes: i.e. a possibility to dispatch long heavy 
trains for long distances or to transport a large number of passengers on shuttle trains within 
short intervals. From this point of view, the decisive factor for efficiency of railway transport 
network is its ability to generate adequate supply of transport capacity in backbone directions 
(Fischer – Bitzan – Tolliver 2001). A factor which decreases density of traffic is duplicity of 
lines, a factor which does not increase density of traffic is inappropriate routing of lines; 
density of actual network is then an irrelevant factor.  
 
1.4. Network effect 
Network effect is defined most often as a change in income from a supplied good depending 
on the change in the number of subjects demanding the identical good (e.g. Katz – Shapiro 
1985, Liebowitz – Margolis 1995b). A positive network effect, i.e. a situation of rising 
revenues in connection with a growth in the market, has a similar impact on a company’s 
functioning as economies of scale. A firm which produces a good incompatible with other 
potential substitutes (i.e. owning a network) has a competitive advantage over producers of 
incompatible substitutes if its network is bigger than network of other competitors. Network 
effect is traditionally associated with railway operations, its manifestation in the past (better to 
say, belief in its manifestation) was reflected in several typical processes: branching of 
integral networks owned and operated by a single carrier, construction of branch and 
connecting lines, unification of track gauges, nationalisation of infrastructure and construction 
of unitary national networks. Surprisingly, empirical studies focused on analysing network 
effect on the railway have not proven its demonstrable relevant existence. When analysing the 
network in a given region, Walker (1992) reached the conclusion that the effect of economies 
of scale is stronger and prevalent, whereas Callan and Thomas (1992) proved as dominant 
density of traffic, network effect being only connected with it. Comparison of two studies of 
North American and European railways is interesting: an analysis of 27 North American 
railways (Friedlander 1993) identified a strong network effect and just weak economies of 
scale, whereas a study by Preston (1994), analysing 14 European railways (see also 
McGeehan 1993, Cantos 2000) proved as a strong network effect, however, depending (along 
with economies of scale) on the characteristic of network. This allows us to deduce a big 
importance of returns from density of traffic (Quinet – Vickerman 2004, p. 151). It may also 
be assumed that the conditions of founding North American railways were more favourable 
for the establishment of an optimal network than European conditions. When analysing 
railway transport, it makes sense to take into consideration the conditions of establishing the 
network, too. It follows from the above-said that returns from density of traffic is decisive for 
efficiency of railway transport.   
 
1.5. Safety of operation 
Traffic accidents are one of the main external costs of transport, together accounting for more 
than 50% of total external costs (Kutáček 2005). Railway transport seems to be 
extraordinarily safe in this connection; an EU estimate puts costs of railway traffic accidents 
at 0.2% to 4.6% of GDP (ECMT 1998). However, this interpretation may contain considerable 
distortions, e.g. Kutáček (2005, p. 48) quotes for the Czech Republic (year 2004) approx. 
1,400 fatal injuries in car accidents and just 8 fatal injuries in railway accidents. When these 
statistics are converted into transport output (i.e. calculated by the numbers of persons 
transported on the roads and on the railway), we get an equivalent figure of approx. 800 
potentially fatal injuries on the railway. Further, taking into account that fatal injuries on level 
crossings are charged to the account of road transport, not railway transport (which basically 
generates them, however), it is obvious that railway accidents cannot be completely 
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marginalised2. It is important for an analysis within the framework of this text that just 
accidents at level crossings are closely connected with the extent of network (i.e. the number 
of crossings of railways with the road transport network) and with density of traffic (i.e. the 
probability of collision of vehicles on a level crossing). The higher is the density of traffic at 
the crossing of the given communications, the lower relatively are the costs of building a 
secured crossing or overpasses of roads and railway tracks. Reduction in external costs of 
transport in the segment of accidents may thus be achieved not only by transferring part of 
transport services from roads to railways (as supposed by revitalisation strategies), but mainly 
by utilising the effect of traffic density on the railway network. 
 
1.6. Emission burden of traffic 
Another significant external cost is pollution of air by emissions. Such costs e.g. for the Czech 
Republic are estimated at 1.1% GDP (Kutáček 2005, p. 47). The current strategy of 
revitalisation of railways in Europe is based on the assumption that railway is capable of 
transporting a comparable volume of goods and number of passengers with a considerably 
lower environmental burden (European Commission 2001). The pitfall of various comparative 
studies on emission burden is that they are frequently based on a status quo ratio of individual 
transport modes in transport of goods and people, without reflecting the ratio. E.g. the study 
by the Centre for Transport Research (Centrum dopravního výzkumu 2004) quantified the 
volume of external costs of railway transport in the Czech Republic as 3.4% of total external 
costs of transport (see Kutáček 2005, p. 47). This, however, does not answer the question of 
how ecologically efficient an increase in the share of railway transport would be. The study 
also did not consider the ecological burden of electric traction, and there are just electrified 
lines that account for the largest transport volumes. Nevertheless, generation of electricity 
burdens the environment with a large volume of emissions and it is still mostly based on 
consumption of non-renewable resources or on nuclear power, still debatable from the 
ecological point of view. Moreover, the technical solution of railway transport is based on 
transportation of a relatively high dead weight: railway cars are substantially heavier than 
road vehicles. It is evident from the above-stated that railway transport may be ecologically 
more efficient only if it is loaded sufficiently; as e.g. Peltrám writes (2005, p. 71), optimal 
transport performance from the point of view of emission burden must be derived from 
marginal transport volumes. This concept is closely connected with the above-described effect 
of returns from traffic density – i.e. the higher will be density of traffic in the given transport 
relation, the higher the effect of reduction in specific emission burden may be expected. On 
the contrary, it may be implied in connection with the network effect that branching of the 
network leads to reduction in density of traffic in the branches, and consequently to reduction 
in ecological competitive advantage of railways over road transport. This means that road 
transport will always be ecologically more favourable for transport of a few dozen tons of 
goods or twenty passengers.  
 
1.7. Occupation of land 
Technical solution of railways enables to transport by a double-track line approximately as 
many people within an hour as a 16-lane highway. One of the world’s busiest airports – 
O’Hare Airport in Chicago – checked in around 60 million passengers a year in the 1990s, 
whereas one of the Parisian railway stations – Gare du Saint Lazare – managed 150 million; a 
standard big airport takes up an area equivalent to about 500 km of a high-speed railway line 
                                                 
2 The number of accidents at railway level crossings in the Czech Republic has been rising over the past few 
years: e.g. 235 accidents in 2002 claimed 24 human lives, three years later 274 accidents occurred, claiming lives 
of 53 people (according to http://www.mdcr.cz/NR/rdonlyres/5530E0E6-4F63-4554-B561-979BEFF4CFAA 
/0/Nehodynaprejezdech.rtf). 
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(Lowe 1994, p. 7). These classical textbook examples, however, are difficult and questionable 
to apply generally. The correct methodological approach would be an analysis of opportunity 
cost; nevertheless, this is extraordinarily problematic since a comparable data base of the 
costs of using individual transport modes is not available (Hibbs 2003, p. 134). Despite this 
the logic of the matter leads to deduction that the decisive criterion will be the price of 
occupied land in relation to the ability to repay this primary cost from operating revenues. 
This criterion also includes the principle of economies of scale and density of traffic, as 
described above, and it should be taken into consideration in this respect also for the purposes 
of public support. It may be concluded, again, that the opportunity cost of occupation of land 
will increase in connection with the network effect and decrease with the effect of traffic 
density. 
 
1.8. Energy requirements of operation 
This concept is utterly out of the scope of economy as, in economic terms, it is included in 
operational costs and thus enters the standard assessment of efficiency of operation. A special 
focus on energy requirements is brought about particularly by strategic and political factors 
connected with dependence on crude oil, imported from politically unstable territories; e.g. 
there are estimates for the USA which say that converting 5% of passenger car transport from 
motorways into electrified railways would reduce imports of oil from the Gulf by 17% (Lowe 
1994, p. 11). Contrary to car or air transport, railways may use, beside diesel traction, also the 
electric traction, based on traditional coal, still available in Europe, or on nuclear power, or on 
a very environmentally-friendly water power. The decisive criterion for a strategic choice 
between a public support to railway or road transport is again the principle of economies of 
scale and returns from density of traffic.   
 
1.9. The concept of competition in railway transport 
The aim of liberalisation and privatisation of railway operations is a higher level of economic 
efficiency of transport services by means of a higher level of economic competition. The 
competition is often viewed as an instrument per se – i.e. the ability of competition to 
promote efficiency of production of services is generally presupposed (e.g. Campos – Cantos 
2000, Estache – Rus 2000). Speaking about railway transport services, two basic forms of 
competition can be distinguished there: competition in the market, and competition for the 
market (Estache – Rus 2000, Quinet – Vickerman 2004). Present strategies of railway reforms 
(as many studies show – e.g. Nash-Rivera-Trujillo 2004) are based on competition for the 
market for train-operated-companies (TOC) as the general principle3. But what is the 
framework the TOCs are competing within? The framework of the railway service market is 
formed (or should be formed – as the EU railway reform’s strategy requires) by the railway 
network separated from the operations and regulated and (usually) owned by the state. That 
means, nowadays, that TOCs are about to compete for the market which is created by the 
railway network established 170 years ago. The core question is whether the network is 
something to be competed about. Naturally, there is no question of technical condition of the 
infrastructure (even if the infrastructure is generally heavily underinvested, as far as Eastern 
Europe is concerned). The problem is the network itself – its compactness, its shape, 
connected points (places), its capacity, duplicity of lines, congestion etc. The right question is 
whether the network is suitable for the TOCs’ business plans, as well as for potential 
passengers’ willingness. The bigger the gap is between the network’s possibilities (limits) and 
TOCs’ / passengers’ demand, the higher is the level of the network’s imperfection (i.e. 
                                                 
3 Actually, there are two levels of competition on the railway service market: the one between TOCs, and the 
other between railways and other transport modes (especially coach services and air transport). The first of them 
only is discussed in this paper.  
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inefficiency). Speaking about the government’s transport policy, the level of this inefficiency 
correlates to the amount of public subsidy the government pays to private TOCs to operate 
non-profit lines. 
 
2. Railway network on the territory of the Czech Republic 
A number of analyses based on simple as well as very advanced econometric methods have 
been carried out and published in order to confirm the above-mentioned assumptions. 
However, generalisation of resulting models and their application in economic policy faces 
serious complications (Nash – Wardman – Button – Nijkamp 2002, p. 16), stemming from the 
specifics and peculiarities of individual national (regional) railway networks. Further in the 
text, I will attempt to describe and analyse one of the specifics in the Czech conditions: the 
way how individual components of the railway network came to existence. The first public 
railway on the present-day Czech territory was the horse-drawn line from Linz to České 
Budějovice (Budweis), opened for operation in 1828, the last big public railway was the line 
from Havlíčkův Brod to Brno, put to use in 1953. Within these nearly 130 years, over 9,500 
kilometres of lines have been built on the Czech territory. Their motivation of founding, as 
well as economic and political conditions at the time of their founding, have differed 
considerably. The history of formation of the Czech railway network may be divided into 
several crucial stages on the time axis: (i) the first developer stage from the 1820s, marked by 
the first private railway companies (particularly the North Line of Emperor Ferdinand – 
KFNB); (ii) the second stage from 1841, when the initiative was taken over by the state which 
started to build the core railway network at its own expense (The North State Line – NStB); 
(iii) a further period of private railways, which began in 1855 by the state’s resignation from 
building and operating railways on its own (because of shortage of funds) and privatisation of 
state-owned railways (The Company of State Line – StEG): this period was also characterised 
especially by coalmine lines; (iv) and the last stage from the 1870s when the state took over 
the initiative again and supported financially a mass construction of local lines. This has led to 
a heterogeneous railway network with a relatively high density (see Cartogram 2.1). This 
network has changed only a little since 1914.  
 
With regard to the above-mentioned conditions for success of the present-day revitalisation of 
railways, the circumstances of founding individual lines are very important: (i) if the incentive 
which led to their founding and which determined economic efficiency of their operation has 
ceased to exist to the present date, a possibility of economically rational and efficient 
transport operation may hardly be expected on such lines at the present; (ii) if the motivation 
of the founding of such lines was doubtful economically, determined by non-transparent 
policies of subsidies and lobbying, their successful revitalisation may hardly be expected 
either. I have defined eight basic archetypes for an analysis of the characteristics of the Czech 
railway network (the archetypes are divided into three groups) of individual railway lines 
according to the type of their founding within the current situational context: 
 
Group A: Lines founded as cost-effective  
1. Lines founded as private enterprises motivated by profit (other than in groups B and 
C). 
2. Lines founded by the state as the backbone network (other than in group C). 
 
Group B: Lines founded as economically inefficient  
3. Lines built by private companies as connecting or duplicate. 
4. Lines built by private companies on an order from the state.  
5. Local lines built with the state’s financial support. 
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Group C: Lines which have become economically inefficient due to changed conditions 
6. Coalmine lines (other than in group A). 
7. Branch lines built by large private railway companies and private local lines (other 
than in group B). 
8. Lines built in different geopolitical conditions (other than in groups A and B). 
 
Cartogram 2.1. Railway network in the Czech Republic. 
 
Source: ČD (Czech Railways) 
 
I include railway lines into the individual groups according to the dominant motive for their 
founding, always considering whether the motivation has endured till the present time or not. 
There obviously occur cases when the changing economic and political situation at the present 
time influences positively the economic efficiency of operating some lines. Because these are 
few isolated cases and because such changes could not have been anticipated at the time of 
building the lines, I do not take them into consideration for the classification of lines. This 
cannot even be subject to any generalising analysis, but rather to an individual assessment of a 
particular line.   
 
Empirical studies carried out on the basis of theoretical concepts mentioned in the first section 
show that the most important factor determining the economic and social efficiency of 
operating individual lines is density of traffic. Therefore, I will first formulate theoretical 
prerequisites of their (in)effective operation for individual groups of lines, based on a 
previous analysis, particularly taking into account the concept of returns from density of 
traffic. Also, this part of the Czech railway network will be compared with the present-day 
density of traffic (Cartogram 2.2).  
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Cartogram 2.2. Density of traffic in the Czech railway network. 
 
Source: ČD (Czech Railways). 
 
3. How individual parts of the railway network were formed 
 
3.1. Lines built by private companies to make a profit 
Private railways were built in Austria4 at the very beginning of ”the railway age” – i.e. 
between 1828 and 1841– without any state subsidy. The state licensed the railways without 
any restrictions or requests as for route planning. This means that the first lines were built 
clearly with regard to economic criteria and connected the most important cities of the 
economy. What is important, there were little to compete about as a railway service market 
was emerging gradually. The first railway was built from České Budějovice (Budweis) to 
Linz in 1828, crossing the Danube-Elbe watershed. The other railway – Kaiser Ferdinand 
Nord Bahn – connected Vienna with Brno in 1839. This railway became one of the biggest 
private enterprises on the Continent; finished in 1855, the line connected Vienna with Ostrava 
and Krakow. The next stage of building private railways began in 1855 and lasted till 1875. 
During this stage the state influenced routing of private lines according to political and 
strategic (nowadays we could say ”public”) concerns – e.g. passing a royal military 
stronghold, the line had to call there, etc. In return, the state began to support private railway 
companies using three ways: (i) guarantee of a minimal gain from invested capital (usually 
5%), (ii) direct subsidy, and (iii) purchase of railway shares by the state. The first private 
railways were followed after 1855 by several private lines connecting Vienna, České 
Budějovice (Budweis), Plzeň (Pilsen), Liberec (Reichenberg) and other major cities.    
 
The private railways built during the first or the second stage connected the most important 
regions of the country – speaking about economic, as well as political importance. During the 
last century a few was changed in this importance. Figure 3.1 shows the network of railways 
of the 1st group – these railways correspond to the lines of the highest traffic density. 1,538 
                                                 
4 The territory of the Czech Republic belonged to the Austrian Empire till 1918.  
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km of these lines were built between 1828 and 1874 with the average length of 102.5 km. As 
for competition, these railways competed in the market freely (during the second stage, they 
competed with some slight restrictions as for routing). Anyway, it could hardly be described 
as a throat-cut competition – the railway companies did not compete with each other as the 
potential market was open and wide. Quite a strong competition appeared at that time between 
railways on the one side and road service and navigation on the other side – this development 
was naturally based on the technological advantage of railway transport. The network was 
shaped according to the demand for transport services – what is the most important, there was 
not (and still is not) any reason for any change of the demand other than a switch from one 
transport mode to another.  
 
Figure 3.1. Lines built by private companies to make a profit. 
 
 
3.2. Lines built by the state as backbone lines 
The state changed its policy towards the railways completely at the beginning of the 1840s: 
the empire’s authorities decided to build the railway network on their own account. The first 
state trunk line was opened in 1841 and connected Prague with Vienna via Olomouc. The 
next line, opened in 1849, made this connection shorter via Brno. The last state line was 
opened in 1850, connecting Prague with Dresden via Podmokly. The capital of Austria – 
Vienna – was connected with the Saxon capital – Dresden, and the capital of Prussia – Berlin. 
As for the Czech network, the lines made a real transport backbone of the economy from the 
west to the east, connecting the major north-south line from Vienna to Krakow.  
 
No other state railways were built after 1850. The Austrian state budget became short of 
money quite quickly (due to huge military expenses) – that is why the state changed its 
railway policy again (and again completely): further development of the railway network was 
based on private enterprise, slightly regulated and supported by the state (as I described in the 
section above). 472 km of the state trunk lines were built between 1845 and 1850 in the 
average length of 157.3 km. Figure 3.2 shows the network of railways of the 2nd group – 
again, these railways correspond to the lines of the highest traffic density. As for competition, 
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there was no competition in the market because the lines were planned and built by the state. 
These lines created the basic (backbone) network connecting the major economic and political 
centres – the demand for transport services was ensured, there is no reason for any change of 
demand today (other than the switch to another transport mode as I mentioned above).  
 
Figure 3.2. Lines built by the state as backbone network. 
 
 
3.3. Lines built by private companies as duplicate lines 
Railmania seized Austria in the 1870s; railway companies expanded their lines, trying to 
exploit the network effect and/or economies of scale. Because the most profitable (i.e. the 
most efficient) lines had already been engaged, the companies tried to find alternative 
connections between connected places, i.e. duplicates of existing profitable lines. The 
problem was the fact that there was no competition for the market there – just competition in 
the market. Each railway company owned its own infrastructure (tracks and signalling) – 
sharing a particular track together with another company was not an option. Let us take into 
account that at the same time the state subsidised private companies to build and run its own 
lines. That all together led to establishing many duplicate lines. Their existence resulted from 
competition in the market – but in unequal conditions (due to non-transparent interventions 
and support of the state).  
 
The major problem of duplicate lines is their operational inefficiency, as the lines were built 
on less convenient grounds. The very typical duplicate lines were built by the Österreichishe 
Nordwestbahn company at the beginning of the 1870s. The lines connected Vienna with 
Dresden, crossing the Moravian Highlands and by-passing Prague – that is why the lines 
recorded lower operational efficiency and lower density of traffic.  
 
Figure 3.3 shows the network of railways of the 3rd group – these railways correspond to the 
lines with low density of traffic. 801 km of these lines were built between 1869 and 1874 in 
the average length of 101.1 km. This part of the network resulted from a very strong 
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competition in the market – however, the competition had evolved under special 
circumstances which I mentioned above (non-transparent subsidy from the state).  
 
Figure 3.3. Lines built by private companies as duplicate connections. 
 
 
3.4. Lines built by private companies on order from the state 
The state – especially the military authority – recognised the importance of railways for 
transport of troops during a war time (namely after the lost war against Prussia in 1866). That 
is why the state charged railway companies to build on their own account several lines which 
had little economic but great strategic sense. Inefficient lines and/or duplicate lines appeared 
within the Czech network. One of the longest duplicate strategic lines built according to the 
political order doubled the old line from Vienna to Krakow along the section which went too 
close to the Prussian frontier. Several other lines had to be built to reinforce connection with 
strategic friend-countries – Bavaria and Saxony. All of them went across hilly areas – these 
lines have little economic importance but high operating costs.        
 
461 km of these lines were built between 1870 and 1892 with the average length of 30.7 km. 
Figure 3.4 shows the network of railways of the 4th group – these railways correspond to the 
lines with a low density of traffic.  
 
3.5. Local lines built by private companies and supported by the state. 
The building of main lines was nearly completed at the end of the 1870s, but a lot of towns 
still lay out of the railway network. There was a problem there because connecting of these 
towns with the main lines of the network was not seen as a good business – that is why it was 
hardly possible to involve private capital in such business without any state support. To solve 
the problem the state issued a special law in 1880 which supported building of the 2nd class 
railways – i.e. local, branch, regional lines etc. The support had two forms: (i) financial 
subsidies, and (ii) technical allowances. As for the financial subsidies, the state guaranteed a 
minimal gain from invested capital, supplied railway companies with capital (a company had 
to invest 25% of the total amount of capital only, the rest was provided by the state without  
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Figure 3.4. Lines built by private companies on order from the state. 
 
 
interest), the loan had to be paid back in 90 years, and so on. As for the technical allowances, 
local railways could be built according to lower standards compared with main lines: light 
track, turns of small diameter, slope up to 50‰, maximum speed up to 15 mph, no signalling 
due to a presupposed low density of traffic (of about 1 or 2 pairs of trains a day). As for 
planning and building the local railways, the key role was played by local lobbies: there had 
to be someone there interested in building a local line to make an extra profit from the new 
line – an owner of a local (usually small) factory, sugar mill, sawmill, quarry, etc. as well as a 
big farm. An important role was played by local politicians as well – they tried to attract 
potential voters by giving them a gift: a new railway to their sleepy town. The principle of 
state guarantee of the minimal gain from invested capital appeared to be an essential motive 
for building local railways. Comparing the local lines built in Bohemia5 – where the gain was 
guaranteed – with local lines built in Moravia6 – where the gain was not guaranteed – we can 
see a significant difference: the total / average length of local lines in Bohemia was about 
1,900 km / 33 km in contrast with 261 km / 14 km in Moravia.  
 
Altogether, local railways were built according to particular interests of local lobbies and 
politicians, but on the account of the state; at the same time the state had little chance to 
influence routing of local lines. This development resulted in building local lines which were 
deficient even at the time of opening, which were able to pay back neither interest nor the 
credit from the state, and served not public demand, but private interest of local lobbies. Not 
surprisingly the local railways are quite inefficient nowadays, as well as they were in the 
history (many empirical studies concluded this fact generally – e.g. Gathon – Pastieau 1995 
or Campos – Cantos 2000, p. 233). 
 
                                                 
5 Bohemia was an autonomous part of the Czech lands surrounding its capital Prague. 
6 Moravia was an autonomous part of the Czech lands surrounding its capital Brno. 
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3,039 km of these lines were built between 1871 and 1914 with the average length of 30.4 
km. As for competition, there was a very strong competition for state support there as well as 
competition in the market – but no competition for the market. According to the initial 
assumption, density of traffic is low on the Czech local lines (see Figure 3.5).  
 
Figure 3.5. Local railways built by private companies and supported by the state. 
 
 
3.6. Coalmine railways.  
At the very beginning of the railway age many lines were built to connect coal mines with 
major cities and steel mills. Coal used to be the most important commodity transported on 
railways: coal was burnt in engines to move trains, coal became the only fuel in steel mills – 
and steel became the most important material for construction of rail tracks, as well as rolling 
stock (Hlavačka 1990) – most of industrial production was directly based on coal. It is clear 
then that building and running of lines to transport coal was a good business – coalmine 
railways were the most profitable ones in the 1800s (Hlavačka 1990). That is why there was 
a very hard competition in the market: many railway companies tried to build a line 
connecting collieries with towns. The first lines were quite short (Brno – Rosice 20 km, 
Prague – Kladno 30 km, Pilsen – Stupno 20 km, etc.), later coalmine lines were built to 
farther destinations (Pilsen – Most 141 km, Řetenice – Liberec 145 km, etc.) and abroad, 
namely to Saxony. The competition between railway companies was neither even nor fair: 
the companies formed local monopolies buying collieries, excluded competitors (i.e. other 
mines) from the market by setting up high tariffs, or by lobbying for additional by-state-
guaranteed privileges, etc. 
 
Because coalmine lines were so profitable, competition in the market resulted in building 
several duplicate lines, connecting e.g. North-Bohemian mines with Prague four times and 
with Liberec twice. At the time when the whole economy depended on coal, all coalmine 
lines were profitable, i.e. efficient – but there is little to transport nowadays: former coalmine 
lines cross the country by-passing towns and connecting collieries and steel mills which were 
shut down years ago. Of course, there are several important and profitable coal mines as well 
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as steel mills and chemical works at the present – these huge plants are well served by several 
main lines I gathered into the 1st and/or the 2nd groups: Prague – Olomouc, Břeclav – Ostrava, 
Ústí n/L – Chomutov, etc. 
 
Figure 3.6 shows the lines of coalmine railways which were built just to transport coal (i) 
from collieries which were shut down, or (ii) to places where there is no demand for coal 
presently (i.e. big cities without heavy industry based on coal – chemical works, steel mills, 
etc.). 1,083 km of these lines were built between 1855 and 1911 with the average length of 
47.1 km. Operating these lines is inefficient today, there is no relevant demand for transport 
services – the coalmine railways belong to the lines with the lowest density of traffic.  
 
Figure 3.6. Coalmine railways.    
 
 
3.7. Branch lines built by private companies without state support. 
Railway companies built branch lines from 1870s, believing it would increase their income 
from network effect and give them a competitive advantage. It was believed that branch lines 
would attract further passengers and increase haulage on main (trunk) lines. Even if these 
lines were built by private companies without a direct state subsidy, the state supported them 
indirectly – by technical allowances in the same way I described in section 2.5, which in fact 
resulted in higher operational costs and lower effectiveness. As for the routing of these lines, 
the major motive was the same as I described for the local lines: serving local factories, sugar 
mills, farms, etc. Putting together, the branch lines were built according to particular interests 
of a local-industry lobby, more or less affecting the density of traffic on trunk lines. As for 
competition, there was a very strong competition in the market as railway companies tried to 
increase their network to the prejudice of the other competitors.  
 
903 km of these lines were built between 1871 and 1911 with the average length of 15.3 km. 
Nowadays, the branch railways are quite inefficient, the density of traffic is low there (see 
Figure 3.7).  
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Figure 3.7. Branch lines built by private companies without state support. 
 
  
3.8. Lines built at the time of different geopolitical circumstances. 
The Czech territory went through difficult political development during the 1800s and 1900s 
– it used to belong to five entities: the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Czechoslovakia, the 
protectorate, Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Czech Republic. This development was 
followed by (i) changes of frontiers, as well as (ii) changes of natural economic and social 
relations, and resulted in re-orientation of the routes of the main North-South connection (i.e. 
Vienna – Prussia / Galicia) to the East-West (Moscow – Slovakia – Prague); finally, the 
routes covered widespread destinations after the collapse of the Iron Curtain in 1989. 
 
These changes resulted in construction of several lines which lost their importance in the 
following periods. Quite a long line (of the length of 150 km) was built to connect West-
Bohemian towns (Rakovník and Beroun) with Vienna directly, i.e. by passing Pilsen, in 1876. 
The line is interesting because it was the only one built by the state on its own account after 
1855 and before nationalisation in the 20th century. Other lines were built in Northern 
Bohemia (Sudetenland) to connect towns inhabited by German-speaking people with their 
neighbouring towns in Prussia and Saxony. Quite an important line (of course temporarily 
only) was built by the state during the period of the protectorate in the 1940s. Nazi Germany 
annexed 35% of the Czech territory and many lines were disconnected, including the most 
important one from Prague to Brno and Ostrava. That is why the state decided to build a new 
line from Prague to Brno. Even though the total length (256 km) of the new connection is 
absolutely the same as the old one (built by the state in 1845), operating costs nearly tripled 
due to the crossing of the Moravian Highlands in the length of 120 km. Nowadays, the line is 
deficient, duplicating the backbone line, having a low density of traffic. Similar lines were 
built to connect Slovakia after WW1 – and resulted in similar troubles.  
 
914 km of these lines were built between 1859 and 1953 with the average length of 45.7 km. 
Times are changing. Some of these lines used to be subject to strong competition in the 
market and used to be quite profitable, some of them were built by order from the state and 
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never made a gain. But all of them will be hardly efficient in the future – competition for the 
market would have to be heavily supported by the state. Figure 3.8 shows the network of 
railways of the 8th group – these railways correspond to the lines with a low density of traffic. 
 
Figure 3.8. Lines built at the time of different geopolitical circumstances. 
 
 
Conclusion 
The aim of this study has been to analyse the Czech railway network with regard to the 
history of its origin, as well as to prove that “history matters“ as far as its present-day 
efficiency and competitiveness are concerned. The principal tool for the analysis was 
comparison of density of traffic on the individual components of the Czech railway network, 
made according to the way how they came to existence. Many railway lines were built as 
unprofitable, with direct financial losses anticipated at the time of construction. We can hardly 
expect the contrary at the present, with conditions for cost-effective operation even having 
deteriorated. Reasons for construction of many lines were other than economic – e.g. 
strategic, social, speculative, and political. Similarly, operation of such lines should be 
considered using social and environmental criteria – in any case, it should be considered with 
respect to the economic and social efficiency of alternative transport modes. From the 
economic point of view, railways were built on the basis of some myths and misconceptions 
(such as overestimating the network effect, economies of scale, impact on regional 
development) – this must be reconsidered nowadays and the effect of density of traffic must 
be applied. It is worth considering in areas where density of traffic is economically 
insufficient whether the loss would be compensated by other social effects. The state itself has 
petrified defects in railway transport by its own activities. Thus, the current railway network 
in the Czech Republic is not a result of efficient, competitive and profitable entrepreneurship 
in the 19th century, but rather a mixture of fragments of previously profitable or highly loss-
making lines built on the basis of different motives, as well as operated by the state on the 
basis of different motives till the present. 
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Figure 4.1. Lines of group A. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Lines of groups B and C. 
 
 
Cartograms 4.1 and 4.2 show the summary of all lines built on the Czech territory which 
possess theoretical prerequisites for being efficient (group A) and lines which lack such 
prerequisites (groups B and C). The comparison demonstrates that lines of group A cover 
directions of those parts of the network which even today manifest a markedly higher density 
of traffic; on the contrary, lines of groups B and C are lines with a very low traffic density. 
 18
With regard to the fact that the initial assumptions have been confirmed, we may suppose that 
not even privatisation and liberalisation of railway operation can raise the efficiency of 
operation on the whole network. Railways can only become a more competitive mode of 
transport in a limited segment of the network. 
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